Causation and epidemiologic evidence: insights from &#8220;toxic cases&#8221; in the US and Italy by S. Zirulia
Causation	and	epidemiologic	evidence:
insights	from	“toxic	cases”	in	the	US	and	in
Italy
Stefano	Zirulia
Proving	causation	between	exposure	to	toxic	substances	and	long	latency	disease	is	often	a	challenging	task.	This	is	clearly
showed	by	the	U.S.	toxic	tort	litigation,	as	well	as	by	the	Italian	experience	of	criminal	investigation	and	trials	for	occupational	and
pollution-related	diseases.	After	a	summary	of	the	main	hurdles	surrounding	the	proof	of	causation	in	“toxic	cases”,	this	post
addresses	the	question	of	whether	the	most	readily	available	type	of	scienti c	evidence	–	i.e.	epidemiologic	studies	–	could	be
used	in	a	di erent,	more	e ective	way	than	has	been	done	so	far
1.	Introduction.	It	 is	well	known	that,	since	the	1970s,	the	U.S.	has	faced	a	wave	of	toxic	tort	litigation,	i.e.	civil	 lawsuits	for
diseases	and	deaths	caused	by	exposure	to	toxic	substances	on	the	workplace,	in	the	environment	or	when	using	consumer
products.	As	a	result,	a	signi cant	amount	of	case-law	and	of	legal	doctrine	on	mass	exposure	cases	have	developed	 in	 the
States;	even	the	general	public	has	some	familiarity	with	such	cases	thanks	to	famous	books	and	movies	based	on	true	stories
(e.g.	A	Civil	Action	and	Erin	Brockovich).
It	is	probably	less	known	–	at	least	among	non-Italian	scholars	–	that	over	the	last	30	years	Italy	has	experienced	a	similar
wave	of	criminal	investigations	and	trials.	Employers	in	dangerous	workplaces,	as	well	as	managers	of	polluting	industries,
have	been	charged	for	o ences	such	as	negligent	homicide,	bodily	injury	and,	more	recently,	endangerment	crimes	due	to	the
adverse	e ects	of	their	activities	on	human	health.
Although	developed	in	di erent	branches	of	the	legal	order,	U.S.	toxic	tort	cases	and	Italian	toxic	criminal	cases	(hereinafter
“toxic	cases”)	must	surmount	the	same	hurdles	when	it	comes	to	assessing	someone’s	responsibility	for	the	consequences	of
long-term	exposure	 to	 toxic	 substances:	 providing	 evidence	of	 causation	 and	 negligence.	 This	 post	 deals	with	 the	 former
issue	(causation),	while	another	will	be	dedicated	to	the	latter.	After	a	summary	of	the	main	di culties	in	providing	proof	of
causation	 (see	 below	 §§	 2,	 3),	 I	 address	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 most	 readily	 available	 type	 of	 evidence	 –	 i.e.
epidemiologic	studies	–	could	be	used	in	a	di erent,	more	e ective	way	than	has	been	done	so	far	(§§	4-7).
 
2.	The	hurdles	of	causation	in	“toxic	cases”.	Anyone	who	is	familiar	with	“toxic	cases”	(torts	or	criminal	cases)	knows	that
“causation”	is	the	most	di cult	element	of	responsibility	to	prove	and	consequently	becomes	the	main	battleground	in	any
dispute[1].	The	plainti 	of	a	toxic	tort,	or	the	prosecutor	in	a	criminal	case,	must	demonstrate	that	the	but-for	cause	of	the
victim’s	disease	was	 exposure	 to	 a	 certain	 toxic	 substance.	Even	when	 conclusive	 scienti c	 evidence	 from	 toxicological	 or
epidemiologic	studies	indicate	that	the	substance	is	capable	of	causing	that	category	of	disease	(the	general	causation	issue),
it	is	often	extremely	di cult,	if	not	impossible,	to	conclude	that	the	substance	is	the	but-for	cause	of	that	particular	victim’s
disease	 (the	 speci c	 causation	 issue).	 This	 situation,	 often	 de ned	 by	 toxic	 tort	 scholars	 as	 the	 “indeterminate	 plainti ”
issue[2],	 arises	 due	 to	 a	 number	 of	 factors.	 One	must	 consider,	 above	 all,	 the	 long	 latency	 period	 between	 exposure	 and
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diagnosis:	unlike	cases	where	the	damage	is	instantaneous	or	nearly	instantaneous	(e.g.	voluntary	assaults),	in	toxic	cases	the
cause	of	the	disease	must	be	sought	over	a	time	span	of	many	years.	This	is	a	complex	task	due	to	the	multifactorial	nature	of
many	diseases	and	the	possible	occurrence	of	multiple	exposures.
Lung	cancer	is	a	well-known	example	of	a	multifactorial	disease:	although	it	is	well	established	that	exposure	to	asbestos	can
cause	the	disease,	 it	 is	de nitely	not	 the	only	possible	cause.	Even	when	some	of	 the	risk	 factors	can	be	ruled	out	(e.g.	 the
a ected	person	was	not	a	tobacco	smoker),	others	will	probably	still	stand	(e.g.	air	pollution),	thus	making	it	impossible	for
the	judge	to	decide	whether	the	exposure	to	asbestos	was	one	of	the	but-for	causes	of	that	speci c	lung	cancer.	The	argument
that	lung	cancer	risk	is	greater	among	those	who	have	been	exposed	to	both	asbestos	and	other	risk	factors	cannot	be	decisive
either,	 as	 it	 would	 require	 particularistic	 evidence	 of	 the	 role	 of	 asbestos	 in	 that	 particular	 victim’s	 case;	 unfortunately,
current	scienti c	knowledge	does	not	allow	us	to	gather	such	evidence.	There	are	numerous	other	similar	cases	of	exposure	to
toxic	 substances	 in	 which	 the	 allegedly	 related	 disease	 is	multifactorial:	 benzene	 and	 leukaemia,	 vinyl	 chloride	 and	 liver
disease;	dioxin	and	non-Hodgkin’s	lymphoma,	etc.
The	multiple	exposures	issue,	which	is	relevant	to	both	multifactorial	and	unifactorial	diseases,	arises	whenever	the	victim
was	repeatedly	exposed	to	the	same	risk	factor	during	the	latency	period.	The	infamous	U.S.	case	of	the	anti-miscarriage	drug
DES	(Diethylstilbestrol)[3]	is	one	example:	many	daughters	of	women	who	took	DES	during	pregnancy	developed	a	particular
and	recognizable	kind	of	vaginal	cancer	(soon	labelled	a	DES-signature	disease).	Because	many	di erent	companies	produced
this	drug,	it	was	almost	impossible	to	trace	each	particular	cancer	back	to	a	particular	manufacturer.	Likewise,	when	workers
who	have	been	exposed	to	asbestos	under	di erent	employers	develop	mesothelioma	(an	asbestos-signature	disease),	it	may
be	impossible	to	trace	it	back	to	a	speci c	employer[4].	Once	again,	the	argument	that	mesothelioma	risk	is	greater	among
those	who	have	been	exposed	longer	is	not	decisive:	yet	unavailable	particularistic	evidence	of	this	role	would	be	required	to
determine	whether	the	exposure	that	occurred	under	a	particular	employer	was	a	contributing	factor	to	the	development	of
the	disease	(e.g.	by	shortening	the	latency	period).
 
3.	The	troublesome	issue	of	the	“attributable	number”	of	diseases	found	by	an	epidemiologic	study.	Epidemiologic	studies	are
often	the	main	source	of	evidence	 for	general	causation	 in	 toxic	cases.	As	mentioned	above,	 they	can	reliably	demonstrate
whether	a	certain	substance	is	toxic	or	 innocuous	to	human	beings.	For	 instance,	 in	observational	cohort	studies	scientists
verify	whether	individuals	exposed	to	a	certain	substance	(X)	develop	a	certain	disease	(D)	at	a	higher	rate	than	those	who	are
not	exposed;	if	so,	and	if	the	excess	rate	of	diseases	in	the	observed	population	cannot	be	explained	by	causes	other	than	X,
then	X	can	be	considered	a	 risk	 factor	 for	D[5].	 This	 is	 how,	 for	 example,	 scientists	Richard	Doll	 and	Austin	Bradford	Hill
discovered	 that	 tobacco	 smoking	 causes	 lung	 cancer:	 they	 observed	 that	 smokers	 developed	 lung	 cancer	 in	 a	 far	 higher
percentage	than	non-smokers,	and	ruled	out	other	possible	causes.	Similarly,	Seliko ’s	epidemiologic	studies	of	 industrial
workers	demonstrated	that	asbestos	can	cause	malignant	mesothelioma,	a	deadly	cancer	a ecting	the	lining	of	the	lungs.
In	some	toxic	cases,	epidemiologic	studies	are	carried	out	among	those	who	allege	to	be	the	victims	of	a	certain	exposure.	This
was	the	case	of	people	exposed	to	asbestos	from	the	Eternit	company:	epidemiologic	studies	on	workers	and	residents	in	the
areas	surrounding	the	four	Italian	facilities	(at	Casale	Monferrato,	Cavagnolo,	Rubiera	and	Napoli-Bagnoli),	found	that	these
groups	developed	typical	asbestos-related	illnesses	(asbestosis,	lung	cancer	and	mesothelioma)	at	a	much	higher	rate	than
the	rest	of	the	Italian	population.	More	recently,	epidemiologic	studies	carried	out	on	residents	nearby	the	Ilva	steel	factory	in
Taranto	(southern	Italy)	and	those	near	the	Tirreno	Power	coal	plant	in	Vado	Ligure	(northern	Italy)	have	identi ed	alarming
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In	such	scenarios	–	i.e.	when	available	epidemiologic	evidence	highlights	an	increased	incidence	of	diseases	or	deaths	among
those	who	allege	 to	be	 the	 victims	–	 the	 lack	of	 evidence	of	 speci c	 causation	 can	 lead	 to	unfair	 judicial	 decisions.	 If,	 for
example,	a	reliable	study	highlights	that	a)	in	a	5	year-period,	among	the	100	workers	of	an	asbestos	company,	there	have
been	40	deaths	from	lung	cancer	instead	of	the	10	expected	cases	(the	background	lung-cancer	risk),	and	b)	the	only	possible
explanation	for	this	excess	mortality	is	exposure	to	asbestos,	because	no	other	particular	hazardous	conditions	occur	(e.g.	the
percentage	of	smokers	among	workers	is	average,	air	pollution	is	not	worse	than	in	the	rest	of	the	country,	etc.),	then	it	 is
virtually	 certain	 that	 there	 are	 thirty	 deaths	 in	 excess	 which	 would	 not	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 exposure	 to
asbestos[6].	 In	 epidemiology,	 this	measure	 is	 called	“attributable	number”,	which	 is	 de ned	 as	«the	 excess	 caseload	of	 a
speci c	outcome	attributable	to	an	exposure	over	a	de ned	time	period»[7].
Whenever	evidence	of	an	attributable	number	is	available,	the	court	(either	civil	or	criminal)	can	come	to	the	conclusion	that
the	 exposure	 has	 caused	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 victims	 (in	 our	 example,	 30	 individuals).	 However,	 in	 the	 absence	 of
particularistic	evidence,	the	same	court	cannot	pinpoint	who,	among	the	a ected	persons	(in	our	example,	40	individuals),
fell	 ill	due	 to	 the	exposure	and	 is	part	of	 the	excess	quota	 (30	 individuals)	and	who	would	have	 fallen	 ill	 even	without	 the
exposure	as	part	of	the	background	risk	quota	(10	individuals)[8].
If	 we	 assume	 that	 speci c	 causation	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 liability,	 then	 the	 attributable	 number	 alone	 can	 never	 be
su cient	evidence	of	causation	in	a	toxic	case.	Consequently	and	unjustly,	even	when	the	court	is	certain	that	the	exposure
has	caused	a	certain	number	of	victims,	if	the	only	available	evidence	is	epidemiologic,	nobody	will	be	held	accountable.	In
order	to	avoid	such	an	undesirable	outcome,	some	courts	–	in	both	the	U.S.	(see	§	4	below)	and	Italy	(see	§	5	below)	–	have
tried	to	approach	the	attributable	number	evidence	from	a	di erent	angle.
 
4.	The	solution	envisaged	by	judge	Weinstein	in	the	Agent	Orange	case:	the	attributable	number	as	“aggregate	loss”	caused	by
the	defendant.	It	was	1984	when	judge	Weinstein	of	the	District	Court	for	the	Eastern	District	of	New	York	signed	his	“fairness
opinion”	 on	 the	 Agent	 Orange	 case[9].	 The	 act	 approved	 the	 settlement	 between	 plainti s	–	 Vietnam	 veterans	 and	 their
families	–	and	defendants	–	manufactures	of	a	herbicide	containing	dioxin,	Agent	Orange,	sold	to	the	U.S.	Government	and
used	to	defoliate	the	forests	in	which	Vietcong	were	hiding	–	in	one	of	the	most	famous	class	actions	in	the	history	of	toxic
torts.	Plainti s	claimed	that	the	exposure	to	Agent	Orange	had	caused,	a	few	years	after	the	end	of	the	con ict,	diseases	such
as	cancers	and	leukaemia,	as	well	as	miscarriages	and	birth	defects.	Because	the	background	risk	for	these	was	signi cant	in
the	general	population,	the	“indeterminate	plainti ”	situation	arose.
As	mentioned	above,	 the	case	ended	with	a	settlement;	however,	 in	 the	 fairness	opinion	 that	approved	 it,	 judge	Weinstein
explained	how	the	case	would	have	been	tried	in	the	absence	of	an	agreement	between	the	parties.	His	argument,	simple	and
yet	brilliant,	started	as	follows:	«Since	the	problem	results	from	a	plainti -by-plainti 	method	of	adjudication,	one	solution
is	to	try	all	plainti s'	claims	together	in	a	class	action	thereby	arriving	at	a	single,	class-wide	determination	of	the	total	harm
to	 the	community	of	plainti s»[10].	 Taking	 inspiration	 from	a	 ground-breaking	 article	 by	David	Rosenberg	 published	 the
same	year[11],	Weinstein	imagined	that	the	phase	dedicated	to	assessing	the	defendant’s	liability	could	be	separated	from	the
subsequent	phase	dedicated	to	quantifying	each	plainti ’s	redress:	the	former	phase	could	well	be	based	on	epidemiological
evidence	 alone,	 because	 its	 purpose	 would	 be	 «to	 hold	 a	 defendant	 liable	 for	 no	 more	 than	 the	 aggregate	 loss	 fairly
attributable	 to	 its	 tortious	 conduct»[12];	 the	 latter	 phase	 would	 have	 consisted	 of	 some	 sort	 of	 mechanism	 for	 the
proportional	distribution	of	the	compensation.
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For	 example,	 Weinstein	 hypothesised	 a	 scenario	 where	 an	 epidemiological	 study	 among	 the	 people	 exposed	 to	 the
defendant’s	toxic	agent	had	found	1,100	cases	of	cancer	 instead	of	the	1,000	expected	cases.	 In	this	 instance	the	defendant
could	be	held	liable	for	injury	to	a	total	of	100	people,	i.e.	the	excess	rate	of	cancers	found	by	the	epidemiologic	investigation.
Since	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 100	 individuals	 injured	 could	 not	 be	 known,	Weinstein	 devised	 the	 following	mechanism	 for	 the
distribution	of	the	redress:	one	had	to	quantify	the	value	of	a	standard	injury	(say	1	million	dollars),	multiply	this	value	by	the
total	number	of	injuries	in	excess	(100	in	this	case)	and	then	divide	the	total	amount	(100	million	dollars)	by	the	number	of
exposed	 individuals	 who	 developed	 cancer	 (1.100,	 in	 this	 case):	 «while	 any	 plainti 	 might	 feel	 that	 his	 or	 her	 recovery
denigrated	the	degree	of	harm	–	concluded	Weinstein	–	the	alternative	of	receiving	nothing	is	far	worse	[…].	Moreover,	the
deterrent	e ect	of	this	result	on	producers	would	be	signi cant»[13].
Weinstein's	idea	had	no	signi cant	e ect	on	subsequent	case-law.	This	was	probably	due	to	its	inability	to	satisfy	one	of	the
essential	 requirements	 of	 the	 tort	 system:	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 speci city	 of	 each	 single	 case	 in	 order	 to	 quantify
appropriate	compensation.	For	the	same	reason,	a	few	years	later	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	expressed	an	unfavourable	opinion
on	the	use	of	class	actions	in	the	 eld	of	toxic	torts,	pointing	out	the	lack	of	the	“predominance”	requirement[14]	whenever
the	individual	questions	(such	as	time	and	extent	of	the	exposure,	type	of	injury,	the	existence	of	intervening	causes)	exceed
the	common	questions	among	the	class	members[15].
 
5.	Similar	approaches	recently	adopted	by	Italian	prosecutors:	 the	excess	rate	of	disease	as	an	“epidemic	phenomenon”	or
“sanitary	disaster”.	In	terms	of	evaluating	the	available	epidemiologic	evidence,	prosecutors	in	the	three	above-mentioned
Italian	 cases	 (Eternit,	 Ilva	 and	 Tirreno	 Power)	 adopted	 an	 approach	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Weinstein.	 In	 all	 three	 cases
epidemiologists	 reported	hundreds	of	diseases	 in	excess,	and	consequent	premature	mortality	among	 those	who	had	been
exposed	to	the	risk	factor[16]:	in	the	case	of	Eternit,	asbestosis,	lung	cancers	and	mesotheliomas	occurred	due	to	exposure,
whereas	at	Ilva	and	Tirreno	Power,	respiratory	and	cardiovascular	diseases,	as	well	as	cancers,	developed	after	exposure	to
toxic	emissions	from	the	plants.
Instead	 of	 charging	 the	 companies’	managers	with	 negligent	 homicide	 and	 injury	–	 as	 had	 been	 the	 case	 in	 all	 previous
Italian	 toxic	cases	–	prosecutors	chose	 to	charge	 them	with	o ences	against	public	 safety,	 in	particular	 those	provided	by
articles	434	and	449	of	the	Italian	penal	code.	Article	434	is	at	the	end	of	a	list	of	o ences	against	public	safety	–	causing	 res,
railway	disasters,	landslides	etc.	– 	and	punishes	the	voluntary	causation	of	"any	other	disaster";	article	449	extends	liability
to	 the	negligent	 causation	 of	 a	 disaster.	 Italian	 jurisprudence	 agrees	 that	 the	 broad	 category	 of	 “any	 other	 disaster”	 also
includes	environmental	damage	due	to	the	progressive	accumulation	of	pollutants,	provided	that	the	related	danger	to	public
health	is	demonstrated	(see,	e.g.	Court	of	Cassation,	judgment	no.	40330	of	2006).
In	the	Eternit	case,	Turin's	Court	of	Appeals	(judgment	no.	5621	of	2013)	went	one	step	further,	arguing	that	“environmental
disaster”	also	 encompassed	 the	 excess	 rate	of	diseases	 and	deaths	highlighted	by	 the	 epidemiologic	 studies	 conducted	on
workers	and	residents	near	the	facilities.	In	other	words,	the	Court	indicated	that	epidemiologic	evidence	can	be	used	to	prove
the	existence	of	a	sort	of	«epidemic	phenomenon»	attributable	to	exposure	to	the	risk	factor.	A	similar	approach	was	adopted
by	 the	 judge	 for	 the	preliminary	 investigation	 in	 the	Tirreno	Power	case.	When	explaining	 the	reasons	 for	seizing	 the	coal
plant	(Decree	 issued	on	March	 11,	 2014),	 the	 judge	argued	 that	article	434	comprises	any	 sort	of	«sanitary	disaster»,	 here
consisting	in	the	excess	rate	of	diseases	and	premature	deaths	recorded	in	the	area.
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However,	 this	position	was	ultimately	rejected	by	the	Court	of	Cassation	(judgment	no.	7941	of	2014,	which	concluded	 the
Eternit	trial),	according	to	which	article	434	“environmental	disaster”	is	just	an	endangerment	o ence	that	does	not	include
the	 resulting	 harm	 to	 human	 beings.	 Determining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 disaster	 was	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	 Eternit	 case
because	 the	o ence	provided	by	article	434	 is	 limited	 to	a	maximum	of	 15	years	after	 the	event:	according	 to	 the	Court	of
Appeals,	since	the	excess	rate	of	diseases	and	premature	deaths	was	an	ongoing	phenomenon	at	the	time	of	the	indictment,
the	 statute	 of	 limitations	 defence	 could	 not	 be	 invoked;	 in	 contrast,	 the	 Court	 of	 Cassation	 ruled	 that	 because	 the	 Eternit
company	had	committed	the	o ence	only	up	until	1986	(when	it	went	bankrupt),	it	could	no	longer	be	prosecuted.
It	is	likely	that	the	Court	of	Cassation	ruling	in	the	Eternit	case	will	only	in	part	a ect	the	outcomes	of	the	Ilva	and	Tirreno
Power	trials,	both	ongoing	as	I	write.	On	the	one	hand,	these	two	cases	refer	to	very	recent	events,	so	that	there	should	be	no
issue	of	time	limitations.	On	the	other	hand,	the	"environmental	disaster"	o ence	under	articles	434	and	449	can	no	longer
be	considered	suitable	to	sanction	the	o ence	in	terms	of	excess	disease	and	mortality	rates,	but	only	as	an	endangerment	of
the	exposed	population	as	a	whole.
 
6.	Why	should	criminal	law	systems	deal	with	the	“attributable	number”?	Expressions	such	as	“aggregate	attributable	loss”
(Agent	Orange),	“epidemic	phenomenon”	(Eternit),	“sanitary	disaster”	(Tirreno	Power)	share	the	same	objective:	they	try	to
describe	 the	 speci city	 of	 the	 attributable	 number,	 i.e.	 a	 collective	 damage	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 only	 through	 the	 lens	 of
epidemiologic	investigations,	from	a	legal	standpoint.
It	 follows	that	 the	cases	described	have	rightly	highlighted	one	of	 the	basic	assumptions	of	epidemiologic	science,	 i.e.	 that
causal	links	undetected	through	a	case-by-case	approach	may	be	found	when	considering	the	exposed	population	as	a	whole.
As	seen	above,	the	attributable	number	alone	has	never	been	the	basis	for	a	 nal	judicial	declaration	of	responsibility,	neither
civil	nor	criminal.	The	reason	for	this,	however,	is	not	that	epidemiologic	evidence	as	such	has	been	considered	insu ciently
reliable[17],	but	rather	that	legal	systems	seem	to	be	unable	to	assign	responsibility	when	the	victims	are	not	identi able[18].
Nevertheless,	as	demonstrated	so	far,	the	speci city	of	the	attributable	number	is	precisely	this:	providing	su cient	evidence
that	a	certain	number	of	harmful	events	would	not	have	occurred	but	for	the	exposure,	even	if	it	is	not	possible	to	name	the
victims.
Focusing	our	attention	on	 the	European	scenario,	 there	are	at	 least	 two	reasons	why	criminal	 lawyers	should	consider	 the
attributable	number	.
The	 rst	reason	is	grounded	in	the	Environmental	Crime	Directive	(2008/99/EC).	According	to	article	3	(a),	(b),	(d)	and	(e)	of
this	 directive,	 Member	 States	 shall	 criminalize	 a	 series	 of	 unlawful	 polluting	 conducts,	 committed	 with	 at	 least	 serious
negligence,	when	–	inter	alia	–	these	conducts	cause	or	are	likely	to	cause	death	or	serious	injury	to	any	person.	Nothing	in
the	wording	of	this	provision	suggests	that	the	obligation	to	criminalize	is	limited	to	cases	where	the	victims	are	identi ed.
Moreover,	given	that	article	5	of	the	same	directive	provides	that	penalties	shall	be	“proportioned”	to	the	wrong	committed,
it	follows	that	Member	States	should	ensure	that	the	actual	causation	of	bodily	harm	or	death	is	sanctioned	by	means	of	more
severe	penalties	than	those	foreseen	for	endangerment	o ences.
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The	 second	 reason	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 right	 to	 life	 jurisprudence	 under	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights.	 The
Court’s	case-law	on	article	2	imposes	positive	obligations	on	the	State	to	protect	the	health	of	workers	and	people	living	near
hazardous	industrial	activities	(see	Grand	Chamber,	Judgment	30.9.2004,	application	no.	48939/99,	Öneryildiz	v.	Turkey,	§
89;	with	regard	to	a	case	of	exposure	to	asbestos,	see	Judgment	24.7.2014,	application	no.	60908/11	and	others,	Brincat	and
others	v.	Malta,	§	101).	Moreover,	when	someone	dies	as	a	consequence	of	those	activities,	State	parties	are	called	on	to	carry
out	o cial	investigations	and	bring	criminal	charges	against	State	o cials	who,	although	fully	aware	of	the	danger,	failed	to
take	measures	that	would	have	averted	it	(Öneryildiz	v.	Turkey,	§	93;	Brincat	v.	Malta,	§	 121).	Now	 imagine	 that	an	o cial
investigation	of	 this	kind	 is	dropped	because	no	evidence	of	speci c	causation	 is	available,	even	 if	a	reliable	epidemiologic
study	shows	that	a	certain	number	of	deaths	(equal	to	the	attributable	number)	are	linked	to	a	given	industrial	exposure	that
could	have	been	averted	if	the	authorities	had	acted	diligently[19].	Would	the	ECHR	consider	that	the	State	had	ful lled	 its
procedural	obligations?	I	would	say	it	had	not,	for	there	is	no	reason	to	make	State	obligations	under	article	2	dependent	on
the	condition	that	victims	are	named,	provided	that	they	can	be	otherwise	quanti ed.	Nor	is	there	an	issue	with	regard	to	the
competence	 of	 the	 Court	 ratione	 personae:	 under	 article	 34	 of	 the	 Convention,	 the	 application	 can	 be	  led	 not	 only	 by
individuals,	but	also	by	groups	of	individuals	or	associations	representing	the	interests	of	the	exposed	people.	 
 
7.	How	criminal	law	systems	should	deal	with	the	“attributable	number”	measure?
Whenever	 the	 evidence	 of	 the	 attributable	 number	 is	 available,	 merely	 charging	 someone	 (e.g.	 the	 manufacturer	 of	 the
dangerous	product)	with	an	endangerment	o ence,	would	mean	 leaving	that	person	unpunished	for	 the	resulting	harm	of
his/her	conduct,	contrary	to	the	above-mentioned	obligations	of	incrimination	from	the	ECD	and	the	ECHR.	Instead,	it	seems
that	two	other	options	are	available.
The	 rst	one	does	not	require	any	legal	reform.	As	I	argued	in	a	recently	published	monography[20],	 if	one	accepts	that	the
attributable	number	expresses	the	number	of	diseases	or	early	deaths	which	would	not	have	occurred	but	for	the	exposure,
then	the	most	straightforward	solution	is	to	apply	the	common	o ences	of	negligent	bodily	injury	and	negligent	homicide,
respectively.	 After	 all,	 why	 should	 a	 conduct	 consisting	 of	 causing	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 unidenti ed	 victims	 be	 treated
di erently	 than	 a	 conduct	 consisting	 of	 causing	 the	 same	 number	 of	 identi ed	 ones?	 Compliance	 with	 the	 “beyond	 any
reasonable	 doubt”	 rule,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 speci c	 causation,	 would	 be	 assured	 by	 testing	 the	 reliability	 of	 the
epidemiologic	study	which	provides	the	“attributable	number”	measure.	To	that	end,	the	fact	 nder	could	use	the	ordinary
criteria	 through	which	 scienti c	 evidence	 is	 admitted	 into	 the	 courtroom	 and	 then	 evaluated.	 Italian	 criminal	 courts,	 for
instance,	has	recently	adopted	a	series	of	tests	which	are	clearly	 inspired	by	the	well-known	U.S.	Supreme	Court’s	Daubert
ruling	(beginning	from	the	Court	of	Cassation	judgment	n.	43786	of	2010,	also	known	as	Cozzini	case).
The	second	option,	on	the	contrary,	does	require	the	input	of	national	legislators.	If	we	are	not	ready	to	accept	that	common
o ences	against	 the	person	does	not	necessarily	 require	 the	 identi cation	of	 the	victim,	 then	 in	order	 to	 comply	with	 the
aforementioned	obligations	of	criminalization,	the	solution	is	the	introduction	of	an	o ence	speci cally	designed	to	sanction
the	 aggregate	 or	 collective	 harm	 caused	 to	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 non-identi able	 victims.	 For	 instance,	 in	 2015	 Italy	 has
introduced	a	new	o ence	of	“environmental	disaster”	which	is	described	as	causing	an	o ence	to	public	safety	where	a	high
number	of	people	have	been	endangered	or	harmed	(art.	452	quarter,	lett.	c	of	the	penal	code).	This	provision	does	not	apply
to	the	aforementioned	pending	cases	(Ilva	and	Tirreno	Power),	for	the	relevant	conducts	have	been	committed	before	2015.
However,	 it	 represents	 the	  rst	 attempt	 to	 introduce	 a	 sort	 of	 collective	 damage	 o ence	 and	 its	 future	 applications	 will
deserve	close	attention.This	website	makes	use	of	cookies	to	enhance	browsing	experience	and	provide	additional	functionality.	 Details
Allow cookies
 8.	Conclusions.
In	“toxic	cases”	it	is	di cult	to	put	forward	evidence	of	causation	which	is	only	based	on	the	epidemiologic	measure	of	an
“attributable	number”	of	diseases	or	premature	deaths.	Although	this	number	indicates	the	number	of	victims	that	(when	the
study	is	reliable)	are	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt	attributable	to	a	certain	risk	factor,	it	does	not	provide	su cient	evidence
of	 speci c	 causation	because	 it	does	not	 reveal	who	 the	 victims	 are.	As	 a	 consequence,	 there	may	be	 situations	where	 the
defendant	 cannot	 be	 held	 accountable,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 an	 incontrovertible	 fact	 that	 he/she	 caused	 a	 certain	 number	 of
diseases	or	deaths.
This	post	has	highlighted	some	of	the	strategies	adopted	in	attempting	to	overcome	this	obstacle,	from	that	suggested	in	the
U.S.	 Agent	Orange	 case	 to	 the	 ones	 proposed	 by	 Italian	 prosecutors	 in	 the	 Eternit,	 Ilva	 and	Tirreno	 Power	 criminal	 cases.
Leaving	aside	 the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	 the	mentioned	cases,	and	considering	 the	provisions	of	 the	Environmental
Crime	 Directive	 and	 ECHR	 case	 law	 on	 the	 right	 to	 life,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 criminal	 liability	 for	 “collective
damage”,	as	demonstrated	by	conclusive	epidemiologic	evidence,	can	no	longer	be	ignored	by	criminal	courts	and	scholars.
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